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Abstract
We study fixation probabilities for the Moran stochastic process
for the evolution of a population with three or more types of indi-
viduals and frequency-dependent fitnesses. Contrarily to the case of
populations with two types of individuals, in which fixation probabili-
ties may be calculated by an exact formula, here we must solve a large
system of linear equations. We first show that this system always has
a unique solution. Other results are upper and lower bounds for the
fixation probabilities obtained by coupling the Moran process with
three strategies with birth-death processes with only two strategies.
We also apply our bounds to the problem of evolution of cooperation
in a population with three types of individuals already studied in a
deterministic setting by Nu´n˜ez Rodr´ıguez and Neves (J. Math. Biol.
(2016) 73:1665–1690). We argue that cooperators will be fixated in
∗EMF had a Capes scholarship. AGMN was partially supported by Fundac¸a˜o de Am-
paro a` Pesquisa de Minas Gerais (FAPEMIG, Brazil).
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the population with probability arbitrarily close to 1 for a large region
of initial conditions and large enough population sizes.
Keywords Markov chains Evolutionary games Coupling method
1 Introduction
The Moran process [12] is a well known discrete-time stochastic model for
the genetic evolution of a population of fixed finite size composed of indi-
viduals of several possible types (phenotypes or genotypes) and assuming no
mutations in the reproduction process. The model was created having in
mind a population composed of individuals of two types, assuming that the
fitnesses of the individuals depend on their types and not on the frequency
of these types in the population. Later on, see [15] and [18], the process was
extended to the context of Evolutionary Game Theory, see [10], [9] or [13],
in which fitnesses may depend on the frequency of the types among the pop-
ulation and are specified through a pay-off matrix. In Evolutionary Game
Theory, the types of individuals in the population are usually referred to as
the strategies adopted by the individuals. Extension of the Moran model for
populations with more than two strategies was made by [20] and opens up a
new class of problems, as this work will show.
In this paper we will study the Moran process for populations composed
of individuals adopting three or more strategies. We acknowledge previous
work by [20], but as their preprint has not been published, we will repeat
part of their work here, adding full mathematical rigor. To be true, the
whole paper is written having in mind that the number of strategies in the
population is three, but the same theory can be easily extended to a larger
number of strategies.
The first difficulty in passing from two to more than two strategies in the
Moran process is that we do not have anymore an exact formula such as (4)
for the fixation probabilities. Moreover, a good understanding of all possible
evolutionary scenarios for the Moran process with two strategies was obtained
by [5] based on a classification of these scenarios provided by [18]. As the cited
works show, the behavior of the stochastic Moran process is naturally related
to the behavior of the deterministic replicator dynamics [19] with the same
pay-off matrix. If the number of strategies is two, we have four scenarios
(without counting the trivial neutral scenario) for the replicator dynamics
and eight for the Moran process [18]. On the other hand, if the number of
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strategies is three, the replicator dynamics is much richer. [3] showed that
the number of possible phase portraits for the replicator dynamics is 47.
In this work, after general results, we will also propose a method to
produce upper and lower bounds for the fixation probabilities in the Moran
process with three or more strategies. With these bounds we will understand
e.g. the behavior of the fixation probability of a pure strategy which is a strict
Nash equilibrium when it is close to fixation. On the other hand, we will see
that in the opposite situation of a pure strategy which is a repeller in the
replicator dynamics, our results are not so conclusive. Despite the progress
we have made, there is still much work to be completed in the direction of
providing a complete classification, as in [18], for the Moran process with
three strategies. As an example, we will apply our results for a single phase-
portrait among the 47 of [3]. Our choice corresponds to one of the dynamics
studied in [16] for the problem of evolution of cooperation.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we will define birth-death
processes and introduce the notation for the Moran processes for two and
three strategies. We will see that for three or more strategies the calculation
of fixation probabilities amounts to solving a large system of linear equations.
We will prove that the systems do have solutions, which are also unique.
In Sect. 3 we will present a general result for obtaining upper and lower
bounds for the fixation probabilities of the Moran process with three strate-
gies by the Markov chain coupling technique. In Sect. 4 we will see that
these bounds can produce interesting results in some situations appearing in
the analysis of particular models, e.g. when we are close to a strict Nash
equilibrium strategy.
Sect. 5 is dedicated to an example concerning the evolution of coop-
eration with three strategies. This example has already been studied in a
deterministic setting in [16].
Finally, in Sect. 6 we draw some conclusions and outline open problems.
Some auxiliary results on birth-death processes necessary for proving
some of the Theorems on the Moran process with three strategies are proved
in the Appendix.
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2 Definitions and notations for the Moran
process with three strategies
2.1 Birth-death processes
In order to introduce the relevant concepts in this work, we start by defining
birth-death processes. As will be soon clear, the Moran process for a popu-
lation with only two types of individuals is a particular case of the following
definition. Although there are other different definitions, the one presented
here is in [13] Sect. 6.2.
A birth-death process is a discrete-time Markov chain such that:
• The set of states S is finite with S = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}.
• States 0 and N are absorbing, i.e. the transition probability from any
of these states to a different state is null.
• The transition matrix of the chain is tridiagonal, i.e. from state i ∈
S \ {0, N} the only non-vanishing transition probabilities are to state
i itself and to states i± 1. The transition probabilities of i to i± 1 are
both positive.
In the context of birth-death processes, a transition i→ i+ 1 will be termed
a birth and a transition i→ i− 1 will be called a death.
With the above definition, it is easy to see that all states in S \ {0, N}
are transient. As a consequence we have the phenomenon of fixation: if we
start at some transient state, then, if we wait long enough, with probability
1 the state will be at either of the absorbing states. An important question
is the probability that one or the other absorbing state will be attained and
how this probability depends on the initial state of the population.
Due to the fact that the transition matrix is tridiagonal, the fixation
probability in either absorbing state can be exactly calculated by an explicit
formula known at least since [12], see also [13] for a deduction. If Xn de-
notes the state at time n, let ai and bi be respectively the birth and death
probabilities at state i ∈ S, i.e.
ai = P (Xn+1 = i+ 1|Xn = i) (1)
and
bi = P (Xn+1 = i− 1|Xn = i) . (2)
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Of course a0 = bN = 0. We let also
ri =
ai
bi
. (3)
This latter quantity will be referred to as the the birth to death ratio.
If pii denotes the probability of fixation at state N when the initial state
is i, then, of course, the probability of fixation at 0 with the same initial state
is 1 − pii. Due to the fact that 0 and N are absorbing, pi0 = 0 and piN = 1.
For the remaining values for i, the fixation probabilities pii [12], [8] or [13],
are given by
pii =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
, (4)
where the numerator in the right-hand side is just equal to 1 if i = 1.
Although exact and explicit, Ewens [8] referred to (4) as “unwieldy”,
because it is difficult to qualitatively understand the sums of products in
it, unless in particular simple cases. Proof of the difficulties in completely
understanding birth-death and Moran processes for only two strategies is the
number of papers on the subject since [18], e.g. [2], [4], [7], [5].
We may also interpret as deaths what we had before called births and
vice-versa. This leads us to defining a dual birth-death process as already
done in [5]. Let
ai = bN−i and bi = aN−i . (5)
The fixation probability at state N of the dual process is calculated by a
formula analogous to (4):
pii =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
, (6)
where rk =
ak
bk
= 1
rN−k
.
Of course,
pii = 1− piN−i. (7)
The duality idea is useful if we want to convert some result on the fixation
probability at state N in an analogous result for the fixation probability at
state 0. It will be invoked again in this paper at the proof of Theorem 10.
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2.2 The Moran process with two strategies
Let N be the fixed finite size of a population in which individuals are of
two different types: either they adopt strategy A, or they adopt strategy B.
The Moran process is a model for the evolution of this population in which
population dynamics results from two independent random choices performed
at each time step: one random individual is chosen for reproduction and one
is chosen for death. We assume that the reproducing individual produces an
offspring with the same type as itself. This assumption will be referred to
as the absence of mutations hypothesis. We also assume that the offspring
of the reproducing individual replaces the dying individual. Population size
remains thus constant in time. The dying individual is chosen uniformly
among the whole population, but the reproducing individual is chosen with
probability proportional to the fitness of its type in a way we will specify
shortly.
It is easy to see that, due to the absence of mutations hypothesis, the
Moran process is a birth-death process as defined above, where the state
i ∈ S is the number of A individuals in the population. When the state is
i, ai is the probability of drawing an A individual for reproduction and a B
for death, and bi is the probability of drawing a B for reproduction and an
A for death.
The transition probabilities ai and bi in the Moran process are calculated
as follows [15]. We assume that each individual interacts equally with all
individuals except itself and with each interaction a “reward” is generated.
This reward will be given by the pay-off matrix. For a game with two-
strategies, the pay-off matrix is a 2 × 2 matrix M = (mij), where mij > 0
is the reward that an individual of type i receives when interacting with an
individual of type j. We will agree that individuals of types A and B will be
labeled respectively as types 1 and 2 in the pay-off matrix.
The fitnesses fi of the A individuals and gi of the B individuals in general
depend on the number of A and B individuals in the population and are
defined [15] as
fi = 1− w + w
[
m11
i− 1
N − 1 +m12
N − i
N − 1
]
(8)
and
gi = 1− w + w
[
m21
i
N − 1 +m22
N − i− 1
N − 1
]
, (9)
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where the intensity of selection is w ∈ [0, 1]. The larger the value of w, the
more the game-theoretic pay-off matrix influences the fitnesses.
As already stated, the probabilities in the reproduction draw in the Moran
process are proportional to the fitnesses. More exactly, the probability of
drawing an A for reproduction is ifi
Si
and the probability of choosing a B for
reproduction is (N−i)gi
Si
, where
Si = ifi + (N − i)gi . (10)
As the death draw is defined to be uniform, then the probability of the
transition from state i to i+ 1 is
ai =
ifi
Si
N − i
N
. (11)
Similarly, the probability of the transition from i to i− 1 is
bi =
(N − i)gi
Si
i
N
. (12)
These should be substituted in (3), giving
ri =
fi
gi
, (13)
which may be used in (4) for calculating the fixation probabilities for the
Moran process with two strategies.
One important case in which (4) is easily understood is when all types
of individuals in the population are equally fit, e.g. when all elements in
the pay-off matrix are equal, or when w = 0, a situation usually called
neutral evolution. In the neutral case, (4) yields pii = i/N . If ρA and ρB
are respectively the fixation probability of a single A or B individual in
a population of size N , i.e. ρA = pi1 and ρB = 1 − piN−1, then we have
ρA = ρB = 1/N in the neutral case.
Another important particular case of (4) is when the fitnesses of A and
B individuals are independent of the frequencies of these individuals in the
population. This case is obtained by inserting w = 1, m11 = m12 = f and
m21 = m22 = g in (8) and (9), so that f and g become the fitnesses of A
and B individuals and r = f/g is the relative fitness of A individuals with
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respect to B. In this case the numerator and denominator in (4) become sums
of finite geometric progressions with ratio r−1 and we get
pii =
1− r−i
1− r−N . (14)
Classifying the evolutionary scenarios for the Moran process should natu-
rally take into account the deterministic dynamics for an infinite population.
The standard choice for deterministic dynamics with frequency dependent
fitnesses is the replicator dynamics [19], which inspired fitness definitions (8)
and (9).
The classification the evolutionary scenarios for the Moran process from
the point of view of fixation probabilities was performed by [18]. Their
classification scheme considers at first whether a single A in the population
is more or less fit than the Bs, and also whether a single B is more or less
fit than the As. This is the natural consequence of taking into account the
replicator dynamics. These fitness comparisons depend in a simple way only
on the population size N and on the pay-off matrix. An important discovery
by [18] is that the evolutionary scenario depends also on whether ρA and
ρB are larger or smaller than their values 1/N for neutral evolution. Simple
combinatorics leads to 16 scenario possibilities, but [18] prove that only 8
scenarios actually exist.
The above classification for the Moran process with 2 strategies was also
treated in [5]. That work associates to each of the 8 evolutionary scenarios a
precise shape for the graphs of the fixation probabilities. Other results in the
same paper are asymptotic formulae for the fixation probabilities in the limit
N →∞. As a consequence of these formulae, it can be shown that some of
the evolutionary scenarios cannot happen for large enough populations.
2.3 The Moran process with three strategies
Consider a fixed-size population with N individuals divided into three types,
say A, B and C. The state of the population at each time n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }
can be specified by the number of individuals of types A and B. Obviously,
if at time n we have i individuals of type A and j of type B, then we will
have N − i − j type C individuals. The state in this situation is denoted
Xn = (i, j). If S = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}, the set of all states is
ΛN = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ S and i+ j ≤ N} .
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AB
C
Figure 1: The triangular mesh representing the states of a population in the
Moran process with three strategies A, B and C. Here we have population
size N = 10.
Consider an equilateral triangle ABC of unitary side length. It will be
useful to represent the set of states ΛN of a Moran process with three strate-
gies as the nodes on a mesh on ABC, see Fig. 1. State (i, j) ∈ ΛN will
be identified with the point on the mesh reached from the vertex C by the
vector i
N
~CA+ j
N
~CB and we will sometimes speak about states and points on
the mesh as synonyms. With this identification, the vertices of the triangle
represent the states in which a single type is present. On the sides of the
triangle, one type is absent.
For future use we define a compact set Λ ⊂ R2 by
Λ = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, x+ y ≤ 1} . (15)
We identify element (x, y) ∈ Λ with the point in the triangle ABC reached
from the vertex C by the vector x ~CA+ y ~CB
As for two strategies, the population dynamics for the Moran process
with three strategies is defined by two independent random choices at each
time step: one individual is drawn to die and another is drawn to reproduce,
its offspring being of the same type as itself, again an absence of mutations
hypothesis. The rules are analogous to the ones already described for the
Moran process with two strategies, see (10), (11), (12):
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• The death choice is made with uniform distribution.
• The reproduction choice is such that the probability of an individual
being drawn for reproduction is proportional to the fitness of the in-
dividual’s type. The exact specification will be given in the following
paragraphs.
The fitness functions f, g and h for individuals of types respectively A,
B and C may be calculated from Evolutionary Game Theory standard pre-
scriptions. Let M be a 3 × 3 pay-off matrix, where mij > 0 is the reward
that an individual of type i receives when interacting with an individual of
type j. We will agree that individuals of types A, B and C will be numbered,
respectively, as types 1, 2 and 3 in the pay-off matrix. As natural extensions
of (8) and (9), fitnesses are given by
fij = 1− w + w
[
m11
i− 1
N − 1 +m12
j
N − 1 +m13
N − i− j
N − 1
]
gij = 1− w + w
[
m21
i
N − 1 +m22
j − 1
N − 1 +m23
N − i− j
N − 1
]
(16)
hij = 1− w + w
[
m31
i
N − 1 +m32
j
N − 1 +m33
N − i− j − 1
N − 1
]
.
If the state is (i, j), the probability of drawing an A for reproduction is
ifij
Sij
, where
Sij = ifij + jgij + (N − i− j)hij (17)
denotes the sum of the fitnesses of all individuals.
Analogously, the probabilities for drawing a B or a C for reproduction
are respectively
jgij
Sij
and
(N−i−j)hij
Sij
.
The above rules define for each 3 × 3 positive pay-off matrix M and
population size N the stochastic time evolution of the population state: a
discrete-time Markov chain with finite state space ΛN . States (0, 0), (0, N)
and (N, 0) are absorbing and all the remaining states are transient [1]. Again,
with probability 1, all trajectories beginning at some transient state will be
absorbed and one important problem is to calculate the fixation probability
of each among the three strategies as a function of the initial state.
As the number of individuals of each type may increase or decrease by
1 unit, or remain constant, the point representing the state either remains
fixed, or jumps to one of the nearest 6 neighbors in the triangular mesh
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of Fig. 1. The Moran process for three strategies can thus be seen as a
two-dimensional random walk on ΛN .
If X and Y may stand for A, B or C, we introduce now notation pXYij
for the probability of drawing an individual of type X for reproduction and
an individual of type Y for death when the state is (i, j) ∈ ΛN . Transition
probability pABij , for example, may be calculated as
pABij =
ifij
Sij
j
N
(18)
because the probability of drawing an A for reproduction is
ifij
Sij
, the proba-
bility of drawing a B for death is j
N
and the reproduction and death draws
are independent.
The other transition probabilities of the chain at state (i, j), calculated
in a similar way, are
pBAij =
jgij
Sij
i
N
, pACij =
ifij
Sij
N − i− j
N
,
pCAij =
(N − i− j)hij
Sij
i
N
, pBCij =
jgij
Sij
N − i− j
N
, (19)
pCBij =
(N − i− j)hij
Sij
j
N
and
pconstij ≡ pAAij +pBBij +pCCij = 1− (pABij +pBAij +pACij +pCAij +pBCij +pCBij ) . (20)
For the sake of future use, we observe that we may write equations (16) to
(20) in terms of the population fractions x = i/N and y = j/N of individuals
of type A and B and all of them will assume the form of a term independent
of N plus corrections that tend to 0 when N → ∞. For example, we define
the deterministic fitnesses
F (x, y) = 1− w + w [m11x+m12y +m13(1− x− y)]
G(x, y) = 1− w + w [m21x+m22y +m23(1− x− y)] (21)
H(x, y) = 1− w + w [m31x+m32y +m33(1− x− y)] .
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Then
fij = 1− w + w N
N − 1 [m11x+m12y +m13(1− x− y)] −
wm11
N − 1
= F (x, y) − wm11
N − 1 + w
(
N
N − 1 − 1
)
[m11x+m12y +m13(1− x− y)]
= F (x, y) + O(
1
N
) , (22)
where x = i/N , y = j/N . Analogous expressions hold for gij and hij. In
several other places in this paper we will be concerned with writing quantities
depending on the state (i, j) in terms of the fractions x = i/N and y = j/N
and seeing a “deterministic” part independent of N and remainder terms
that vanish as N →∞.
We can now write the equations which solutions allow us to calculate the
fixation probability of individuals of types A, B or C. We will denote αij the
fixation probability of A individuals if the initial state is (i, j). For B and
C individuals with the same initial state the fixation probabilities will be
denoted respectively βij and γij. Taking into account the seven possibilities
for the state after one time step and the corresponding transition probabilities
to them from state (i, j), the fixation probability αij may be written as
αij = p
AB
ij αi+1,j−1 + p
BA
ij αi−1,j+1 + p
AC
ij αi+1,j + p
CA
ij αi−1,j + p
BC
ij αi,j+1
+ pCBij αi,j−1 + p
const
ij αij .
Reorganizing the terms of the above expression we have
αij =
1
1− pconstij
[
pABij αi+1,j−1 + p
BA
ij αi−1,j+1 + p
AC
ij αi+1,j + p
CA
ij αi−1,j
+ pBCij αi,j+1 + p
CB
ij αi,j−1
]
. (23)
Since 1 − pconstij = pABij + pBAij + pACij + pCAij + pBCij + pCBij , it follows from
(23) that αij is a weighted average of the values of the same function in the 6
nearest neighbors of state (i, j) in the triangular mesh. The same equations
remain valid if αij is replaced for βij or γij. These relations for the fixation
probabilities can also be found in [20].
We have one equation of the type (23) for each point of the mesh in the
interior of the triangle ABC. The values of αij at the points of the mesh on
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the boundary of the triangle are known. In fact, for the points on the BC
side, we have
α0,j = 0 , (24)
j = 0, . . . , N , because on this side there are no A type individuals and the
absence of mutations hypothesis prohibits them to be produced by Bs or Cs.
For the rest of the border we have at most two types of individuals and we
may use (4). On the AB side of the triangle we thus have
αi,N−i =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1(r
AB
k )
−1
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1(r
AB
k )
−1 , (25)
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where rABk =
fk,N−k
gk,N−k
, is the relative fitness of type A individ-
uals with respect to B individuals in the absence of type C individuals. On
the AC side of the triangle,
αi,0 =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1(r
AC
k )
−1
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1(r
AC
k )
−1 , (26)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N and with rACk =
fk,0
hk,0
.
The calculation of αij for the mesh points in the interior of the triangle
amounts thus to solving a system of linear equations (23) with (N − 1)(N −
2)/2 unknowns, one for each point of the mesh in the interior of the triangle.
Equations (24), (25) and (26) act as Dirichlet boundary conditions. This
problem bears some similarities with the problem of approximating the solu-
tion of a two-dimensional Dirichlet problem for the Laplace equation using
finite differences, see e.g. [17]. In the approximation of the two-dimensional
Laplace equation in a rectangular lattice, a simple arithmetic mean of 4 neigh-
boring lattice points appears. In our problem, instead, we have a weighted
average of 6 neighbors.
The problems of calculating the fixation probabilities βij for B individ-
uals and γij for C individuals are completely analogous. As the transition
probabilities appearing in (23) are the same regardless we are calculating the
fixation probability for A, B or C, equations (23) are exactly the same, but
boundary conditions (24), (25) and (26) must be replaced by their analogues.
We will end this section by proving that the problems of finding the
fixation probabilities for the Moran process with three strategies are all well-
posed in the sense that the corresponding linear systems have unique solu-
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tions. The following proofs are adaptations of the corresponding ones for the
finite-differences Laplace equation, see e.g. [17].
We say that R ⊂ ΛN is a connected region if for any states (i1, j1) and
(i2, j2) in R there is a path between the corresponding points in the triangle
ABC passing only through the links of the mesh and without passing by
points representing states not in R. We also say that a state is in the interior
of R if the point representing it has 6 neighbors at distance 1/N in the mesh
and all of them represent states in R. Otherwise we will say that it is a
border point of R.
The following result is a generalization of a familiar property of the so-
lutions of the Laplace equation. It will be used in proving uniqueness of the
solutions for the fixation probabilities:
Proposition 1 (Maximum and minimum property) Let R ⊂ ΛN be
connected. Then the maximum and the minimum of the fixation probabil-
ity function α restricted to R are on the border of R. The same property
holds also for the maximum and the minimum of β and γ.
Proof Assume that the fixation probability function α, reaches its max-
imum at a state (i∗, j∗) in the interior of R.
We know that αi∗j∗ is the weighted average of the function α in the 6
nearest neighbors of (i∗, j∗) on ΛN , all of which are in R. Being an average,
αi∗j∗ cannot be strictly larger than any of the values of α at all the 6 nearest
neighbors. As it is the maximum in the set with elements (i∗, j∗) and its
6 nearest neighbors, then the values of α at all these 7 points must be the
same. If we repeat the argument for the nearest neighbors of the nearest
neighbors, and so on, we conclude that the occurrence of a maximum of α at
an interior point implies that α is constant on R, so that the maximum also
occurs at the border.
A similar argument holds for the minimum of α and also for β and γ.
We can now prove
Theorem 1 (Uniqueness of α, β and γ) The linear system of equations
(23) for (i, j) ∈ ΛN with boundary conditions (24), (25) and (26) has a
unique solution. The same holds also for the analogous systems for β and γ.
Proof If we order in some way the points of ΛN , then the linear system
for α may be written in matrix form EX = F , where E is a square matrix
of dimension (N − 1)(N − 2)/2 and F is a column matrix depending only on
the boundary conditions (24), (25) and (26).
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We claim that the only solution of the corresponding homogeneous linear
system EX = 0 is the trivial X = 0. In fact, the set of solutions for this
homogeneous system is non-empty and the maximum and minimum property
holds for these solutions. As the boundary condition for EX = 0 is 0 at all
border points of ΛN , then the maximum and minimum of the solutions of
EX = 0 must be 0. Thus, the only solution is the trivial one.
As a consequence, we must have detE 6= 0. It follows that E is invertible
and EX = F has a unique solution.
Uniqueness of β and γ follow because the same matrix E appears as the
coefficient matrix of the corresponding linear systems. 
3 Coupling results
We have already seen that the fixation probabilities for the Moran process
with three strategies can be calculated by solving a linear system, but we
no longer have an explicit formula for the solution, as (4) in the case of
two strategies. We will show however that we can provide upper and lower
bounds for these probabilities. These bounds will be derived by the coupling
method [6].
Coupling is a powerful way of comparing two or more random variables
by constructing them simultaneously through the same random device. More
specifically, for a given Moran process with three strategies, which we call
target chain, we will construct a birth-death process as defined in Sect. 2,
which we call comparison chain, in which the fixation probability is explicitly
calculated. We may realize the two chains simultaneously, and, as will be
seen, this will give us bounds for the fixation probability in the target chain in
terms of the exactly calculated fixation probability in the comparison chain.
In what follows, we will use the notations previously introduced for the
transition probabilities both for birth-death processes and Moran processes
with three strategies. More concretely, ai and bi will stand respectively for
birth and death probabilities at state i in a birth-death process, and pXYij are
transition probabilities in the Moran process with three strategies introduced
in (18) and further equations. We also introduce
Z+ij = p
AB
ij + p
AC
ij and Z
−
ij = p
BA
ij + p
CA
ij (27)
for the probabilities of respectively increasing and decreasing the number of
A individuals when the state is (i, j).
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We start with a general result:
Theorem 2 Consider a Moran process with three strategies. Suppose that
there exists a birth-death process with states {0, 1, 2, . . . , N} such that for all
(i, j) ∈ ΛN the birth and death probabilities satisfy
ai ≤ Z+ij and bi ≥ Z−ij (28)
and also
ai−1 ≤ 1− Z−ij . (29)
If αij denotes the fixation probability of the strategy A and pii is the fixation
probability at state N in the birth-death process, then
αij ≥ pii (30)
for all (i, j) ∈ ΛN .
In the above result, the target chain is the Moran process with three
strategies and the comparison chain is the birth-death process. We may
calculate the fixation probability pii of the comparison chain by (4), thus
obtaining a lower bound for the fixation probability αij of the Moran process
with three strategies.
Proof For each (i, j) ∈ ΛN , consider the following mutually disjoint inter-
vals, all contained in [0, 1]: I1(i, j) = [0, q1(i, j)), Ik(i, j) = [qk−1(i, j), qk(i, j)),
k = 2, 3, . . . , 6 and I7(i, j) = [q6(i, j), 1], where q1(i, j) = p
AB
ij , q2(i, j) =
q1(i, j) + p
AC
ij , q3(i, j) = q2(i, j) + p
BC
ij , q4(i, j) = q3(i, j) + p
const
ij , q5(i, j) =
q4(i, j) + p
CB
ij , q6(i, j) = q5(i, j) + p
CA
ij = 1− pBAij . Notice that
⋃7
k=1 Ik(i, j) =
[0, 1], that the sum of the lengths of I1(i, j) and I2(i, j) is Z
+
ij and that the
sum of the lengths of I6(i, j) and I7(i, j) is equal to Z
−
ij .
For each i ∈ S, we construct another set of mutually disjoint intervals
contained in [0, 1] related to the comparison chain: J1(i) = [0, ai), J2(i) =
[ai, 1− bi) and J3(i) = [1− bi, 1]. Conditions (28) imply
J1(i) ⊂ I1(i, j) ∪ I2(i, j) and J3(i) ⊃ I6(i, j) ∪ I7(i, j) . (31)
The following vectors are the possible displacements in the state of the
target chain: d1 = (1,−1), d2 = (1, 0), d3 = (0, 1), d4 = (0, 0), d5 = (0,−1),
d6 = (−1, 0) and d7 = (−1, 1).
Suppose that at time 0 the states of the target and comparison chains
are respectively X0 = (i0, j0) and Y0 = i0. The coupling of the target and
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comparison chains is accomplished by a sequence of independent uniformly
distributed random variables U1, U2, U3, · · · ∈ [0, 1] which will determine the
state of both chains at all subsequent times.
The state of both chains at time 1 will be obtained by displacements
calculated as functions of U1, then at time 2 by displacements calculated as
functions of U2, and so on. The way these displacements are calculated is as
follows.
We declare that if the state of the target chain at time `−1 is (i`−1, j`−1),
then the `-th displacement of the target chain will be dk if U` ∈ Ik(i`−1, j`−1),
k = 1, 2, . . . , 7, ` = 1, 2, . . . . For the comparison chain, we declare that if its
state at time ` − 1 is i′`−1, ` = 1, 2, . . . , then the displacement of the state
of the comparison chain will be 1, 0, or -1, respectively, if U` is in J1(i
′
`−1),
J2(i
′
`−1) or J3(i
′
`−1). Notice that the construction up to now is such that the
probabilities of the possible displacements of both chains are all correctly
distributed according to the chains’ transition probabilities.
A fundamental observation is that, due to (31), whenever U1 is such that
there is a birth in the comparison chain, then the number of A individuals
in the target chain will increase. And also, whenever U1 is such that the
number of A individuals decreases in the target chain, then there is a death
in the comparison chain. As i′0 = i0, it follows that i1 ≥ i′1.
We will prove by induction that ik ≥ i′k ∀k ∈ N. Suppose that ik ≥ i′k
for a certain k ∈ N. By the same reasoning used in proving that i1 ≥ i′1,
we see that if ik = i
′
k, then ik+1 ≥ i′k+1. If ik ≥ i′k + 2, then the conclusion
ik+1 ≥ i′k+1 also holds, because ik+1 ≥ ik − 1 and i′k+1 ≤ i′k + 1. The only
case in which it remains to prove that ik+1 ≥ i′k+1 is when ik = i′k + 1. In
this case, we use condition (29), which we had not used, yet. This condition
proves that if Uk is such that a birth occurs in the comparison chain, then
the number of A individuals in the target chain will not decrease and we will
still have ik+1 ≥ i′k+1.
We have thus realized simultaneously the target and comparison chains
according to their respective transition matrices in a way such that the initial
states are respectively (i0, j0) and i0 and whenever there is fixation at state
N for the comparison chain, then there will be fixation of strategy A in the
target chain. Thus αi0,j0 ≥ pii0 . As i0 is arbitrary, the theorem is proved. 
An analogous result can be used to find an upper bound for the fixation
probability in a Moran process with three strategies.
Theorem 3 Consider a Moran process with three strategies and the same
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notation introduced before Theorem 2. If there exists a birth-death process
with states {0, 1, 2, . . . , N} such that for all (i, j) ∈ ΛN the birth and death
probabilities satisfy
ai ≥ Z+ij and bi ≤ Z−ij (32)
and also
bi+1 ≤ 1− Z+ij , (33)
then
αi,j ≤ pii (34)
for all (i, j) ∈ ΛN .
At this point the reader may wonder if we can in fact find comparison
chains satisfying the hypotheses in Theorems 2 and 3, so that upper or lower
bounds for Moran processes with three strategies are produced. We show
now that such comparison chains do exist in the important case of a Moran
process with three strategies and frequency independent fitnesses. Although
frequency independent fitnesses may be thought of as too much trivial, we
know no other bounds for this particular case. Moreover, it will be seen
that the following result will suggest how to obtain comparison chains for
the general case.
Theorem 4 Consider a Moran process for three types of individuals A, B
and C and population size N , with frequency-independent fitnesses respec-
tively given by f > 0, g > 0 and h > 0. Suppose without loss of generality
that f > g > h. Then the following bounds hold for all (i, j) ∈ ΛN :
1−
(
f
g
)−i
1−
(
f
g
)−N ≤ αij ≤ 1−
(
f
h
)−i
1− (f
h
)−N (35)
1−
(
g
f
)−j
1−
(
g
f
)−N ≤ βij ≤ 1−
(
g
h
)−j
1− ( g
h
)−N (36)
1−
(
h
f
)−(N−i−j)
1−
(
h
f
)−N ≤ γij ≤ 1−
(
h
g
)−(N−i−j)
1−
(
h
g
)−N . (37)
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Inequalities f > g > h state that A individuals are fitter than Bs, which in
turn are fitter than Cs. Focusing now on A individuals, the intuition behind
the bounds above is that it becomes easier for As to fixate if we replace all
Bs by Cs. The upper bound for αij in (35) is just the fixation probability
for A in a population with i A individuals and N − i Cs calculated by (14).
Similarly, it is harder for As to fixate if we replace Cs by Bs, and the lower
bound in (35) is just the fixation probability for a population of i As and
N − i Bs. The upper and lower bounds in (36) and (37) are analogous.
The rigorous proof for this intuition uses Theorems 2 and 3 with comparison
chains obtained replacing individuals of one type by individuals of the other
two types. In order to prove Theorem 4 and other results ahead, we will need
the following result:
Proposition 2 Let Z±ij be defined as in (27). Then, for each fixed value of
i, the minimum of Z+ij and the maximum of Z
−
ij for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − i} are
attained at the same value of j. Also, the maximum of Z+ij and the minimum
of Z−ij for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − i} are attained at the same value of j.
Proof Just notice that Z+ij = i
fij
Sij
N−i
N
and Z−ij =
jgij+(N−i−j)hij
Sij
i
N
may
be rewritten as (1 − i fij
Sij
) i
N
. For fixed i the value of j minimizing i
fij
Sij
will
maximize 1− i fij
Sij
.
We can now finally prove Theorem 4:
Proof Let ai be the probability of increasing the number of A individuals
from i to i+1 in a population with only A and B individuals. We also define
bi as the probability of decreasing the number of A individuals from i to i−1
in a population with only A and B individuals. As in (27), let Z+ij and Z
−
ij
be respectively the probabilities of increasing and decreasing the number of
A individuals from i to i ± 1 in a population with A, B and C individuals
and frequency independent fitnesses. We have
ai =
if
if + (N − i)g
N − i
N
, Z+ij =
if
if + jg + (N − i− j)h
N − i
N
,
bi =
(N − i)g
if + (N − i)g
i
N
, Z−ij =
jg + (N − i− j)h
if + jg + (N − i− j)h
i
N
.
As g > h, then if+(N−i)g = if+jg+(N−i−j)g ≥ if+jg+(N−i−j)h
for all (i, j) ∈ ΛN . It follows that
ai = Z
+
i,N−i ≤ Z+ij (38)
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for all (i, j) ∈ ΛN .
By Proposition 2, bi = Z
−
i,N−i ≥ Z−ij for all (i, j) ∈ ΛN . We have thus
proved that conditions (28) in Theorem 2 are fulfilled. The lower bound in
(35) will result if we prove that (29) is true.
In fact, it can be seen, after some tedious manipulations, that
1− Z−ij − ai−1 =
=
1
NSijSi−1,N−i+1
{
i(i− 1)2f 2 + (N − i+ 1)(N − i)g Sij
+ if [(N − i− j)(g − h) + [(i− 1)(N − i) + i]g] + [jg + (N − i− j)h]f} .
As all terms around the curly brackets in the above expression are obviously
non-negative, as well as the denominator NSijSi−1,N−i+1, then condition (29)
is satisfied and the lower bound in (35) proved.
All the remaining bounds can be proved in an analogous way, either using
Theorem 2 or Theorem 3. 
An interesting consequence of Theorem 4 concerns the behavior of the
fixation probabilities α, β and γ when population size N tends to infinity.
For large populations we expect that the randomness inherent in the Moran
process becomes less important and, if the Moran process is compatible with
natural selection, only the fittest individuals should survive. In order to
prove this compatibility, it is necessary that the fractions x, y and 1− x− y
of A, B and C individuals are fixed, whereas the respective numbers thereof
tend to infinity. This idea is precisely defined if we define for (x, y) ∈ Λ
AN(x, y) = α[Nx],[Ny] ,
BN(x, y) = β[Nx],[Ny] , (39)
ΓN(x, y) = γ[Nx],[Ny] ,
where [z] denotes the integer closest to z and the set Λ was defined in (15).
Corollary 1 Consider the same hypotheses of Theorem 4. Then, for any
(x, y) ∈ Λ, AN(x, y) N→∞→ 1, BN(x, y) N→∞→ 0 and ΓN(x, y) N→∞→ 0.
Proof By Theorem 4,
AN(x, y) ≥
1−
(
g
f
)[Nx]
1−
(
g
f
)N .
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The result for AN is proven by taking the limit N →∞ and using f > g > 0.
The results for BN and ΓN follow because they are both probabilities and
their sum with AN equals 1. 
The following theorem is a generalization of the ideas presented in The-
orem 4 and works as a general “recipe” for constructing comparison chains
satisfying hypotheses of Theorems 2 and 3. Contrarily to Theorem 4, the
proof for the next result requires that the population size N is large enough.
We are not sure whether this is a necessary condition.
Theorem 5 Consider a Moran process with three strategies and the notation
introduced in Theorem 2. Define a comparison birth-death process with birth
and death probabilities respectively given by
alowi = min
0≤j≤N−i
Z+ij and b
low
i = max
0≤j≤N−i
Z−ij . (40)
Let pilowi denote the fixation probability in state N of the comparison birth-
death process and αij denote the Moran process fixation probability for type
A in the initial state (i, j). Then, for large enough N ,
αij ≥ pilowi .
Similarly, if we define another birth-death with fixation probability piupi by
taking
aupi = max
0≤j≤N−i
Z+ij and b
up
i = min
0≤j≤N−i
Z−ij , (41)
then, for large enough N ,
αij ≤ piupi .
Proof We will show that the birth-death process (40) satisfies the hy-
potheses of Theorem 2 for N large enough. The proof that the process
defined by (41) satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 3 for large enough N is
analogous.
By (40), we automatically have for each i that alowi ≤ Z+ij and blowi ≥ Z−ij
for all j such that (i, j) ∈ ΛN . To complete the proof, we need to show that
alowi−1 ≤ 1− Z−ij if N is large enough.
To see that, we write
1− Z−ij − Z+i−1,j = (1− Z−ij − Z+ij ) + (Z+ij − Z+i−1,j) . (42)
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The first term 1−Z−ij −Z+ij is the probability at state (i, j) that the number
of A individuals remains constant. It can be written as the sum pAAij +(p
BC
ij +
pCBij + p
BB
ij + p
CC
ij ), in which p
AA
ij vanishes only if i = 0 and the sum of the
remaining four terms vanishes only if i = N .
Writing x = i/N and y = j/N and using a reasoning similar to the one
exemplified in (22), we get
1− Z−ij − Z+ij = C1(x, y) + C2(x, y) +O(
1
N
) , (43)
where
C1(x, y) =
x2F (x, y)
xF (x, y) + yG(x, y) + (1− x− y)H(x, y)
comes from pAAij and
C2(x, y) =
(1− x)(yG(x, y) + (1− x− y)H(x, y))
xF (x, y) + yG(x, y) + (1− x− y)H(x, y)
comes from the sum pBCij + p
CB
ij + p
BB
ij + p
CC
ij .
Observe that both C1 and C2 are continuous functions with values in
[0, 1] in the compact triangle Λ defined in (15). Moreover C1(1, 0) = 1 and
C2(0, y) = 1, so that there exist x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1], x1 < x2 such that C2(x, y) ≥
1/2 if (x, y) ∈ Λ with x ≤ x1 and C1(x, y) ≥ 1/2 if (x, y) ∈ Λ with x ≥ x2.
As neither C1 and C2 vanishes for the points (x, y) ∈ Λ with x ∈ [x1, x2], then
their sum has a positive minimum value µ in this set. Of course the minimum
value of C1 +C2 in Λ cannot be smaller than the smallest between µ and 1/2,
being then positive and independent of N . This proves that 1− Z−ij − Z+ij is
bounded away from 0 for large enough N .
Using the same ideas,
Z+ij = D(x, y) +O(
1
N
) ,
with
D(x, y) =
x(1− x)F (x, y)
xF (x, y) + yG(x, y) + (1− x− y)H(x, y) .
Then the second summand in the right-hand side of (42) becomes
Z+ij − Z+i−1,j = D(x, y)−D(x−
1
N
, y) +O(
1
N
)
= − 1
N
∂D
∂x
(x, y) +O(
1
N
) .
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We have thus shown that one of the terms in the right-hand side of (42) is
positive and O(1), and the other is O( 1
N
). This proves that 1−Z−ij−Z+i−1,j > 0
for all (i, j) ∈ ΛN for large enough N and the proof is completed. 
4 Strict Nash equilibria and related results
In general, consequences of Theorem 5 depend on knowing for each i the
location of the maximum or of the minimum among the values Z+ij , j =
1, 2, . . . , N − i. As we will see in a concrete example in Sect. 5, this may be
a complicated task. The results in this section refer to important situations
in which Theorem 5 may be used without the need of locating the maximum
or the minimum of the Z+ij .
One situation is the N →∞ limit of the fixation probability of a strategy
when this strategy is a strict Nash equilibrium and its population frequency
is close to 1. We remind that strategy A is a strict Nash equilibrium (see
e.g. [9] or [13]) if m11 > mi1 for i = 2 and i = 3. It can be shown that if
A is a strict Nash equilibrium, then the point (1, 0) ∈ Λ corresponding to
the whole population being of type A is an asymptotically stable equilibrium
for the replicator dynamics. In other words, every orbit of the replicator
dynamics which starts close enough to point (1, 0) will end in that point.
As an important similarity of the Moran process with deterministic dynam-
ics we will show that if strategy A is a strict Nash equilibrium, then there
exists a neighborhood of (1, 0) in Λ such AN(x, y)
N→∞→ 1 for (x, y) in this
neighborhood.
As we will shortly see, the above claim will follow as a consequence of
this more general result:
Theorem 6 Consider a Moran process with three strategies. Suppose there
exist s > 1, N∗ ∈ N and x∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that if N ≥ N∗ and i
N
> x∗, then
Z+ij
Z−ij
≥ s
holds ∀j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − i}. Then
lim
N→∞
AN(x, y) = 1
for all (x, y) ∈ Λ with x > x∗.
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Proof Let x ∈ (0, 1) and consider the lower bound comparison birth-
death process defined in Theorem 5 by (40). By Proposition 2, we know that
the maximum over j of Z−[Nx],j and the minimum over j of Z
+
[Nx],j occur at
the same value j(x) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , [Nx]}. In other words,
rlow[Nx] ≡
alow[Nx]
blow[Nx]
=
Z+
[Nx],j(x)
Z−
[Nx],j(x)
.
Suppose now that x > x∗ and take N ≥ N∗ and also large enough so
that [Nx]/N > x∗. Then rlow[Nx] is strictly greater than s for all x > x
∗.
By Theorem 11 in Appendix A, we conclude that limN→∞ pilow[Nx] = 1 for all
x > x∗. As, by Theorem 5, pilow[Nx] ≤ α[Nx],[Ny], the theorem is proved. 
We can now prove our important result concerning the case of strategy
A being a strict Nash equilibrium:
Theorem 7 Consider a Moran process with three strategies such that strat-
egy A is a strict Nash equilibrium. Then there exists x∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that
limN→∞AN(x, y) = 1 for all (x, y) ∈ Λ with x > x∗.
Proof We will show that there exist x∗, s and N∗ as in the hypotheses
of Theorem 6. The result will then follow as a consequence of that theorem.
In fact, if strategy A is a strict Nash equilibrium, then F (1, 0) > G(1, 0)
and F (1, 0) > H(1, 0), see (21), and, by continuity, we have a neighborhood
of (1, 0) in Λ in which the deterministic fitness F is strictly larger than both
G and H.
Let x1 be the greatest lower bound of the values x ∈ [0, 1] such that
F (x, y) > G(x, y) and F (x, y) > H(x, y) hold simultaneously for all y such
that (x, y) ∈ Λ.
In analogy with what we did in (43), we may rewrite Z+ij/Z
−
ij as an asymp-
totic term R(x, y), where x = i/N and y = j/N , plus corrections that tend
to 0 as N →∞. We obtain
R(x, y) =
(1− x)F (x, y)
yG(x, y) + (1− x− y)H(x, y) , (44)
which is continuous in Λ \ (1, 0).
Choose x∗ ∈ (x1, 1) and define Λ∗ = {(x, y) ∈ Λ ;x∗ ≤ x < 1}. If we
define R∗ = inf(x,y)∈Λ∗ R(x, y), we claim that R∗ > 1.
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In fact, although R is not defined at (1, 0), both F/G and F/H are
continuous at this point. So, we define S(x, y) = min
{
F (x,y)
G(x,y)
, F (x,y)
H(x,y)
}
, which
is continuous in the compact set Λ∗ = Λ∗ ∪ {(1, 0)}. Let s∗ be the minimum
value of S on Λ∗. As F (x, y) > G(x, y) and F (x, y) > H(x, y) in Λ∗, then
s∗ > 1. Moreover, R(x, y) ≥ S(x, y) for (x, y) ∈ Λ∗. Thus R∗ ≥ s∗, proving
our claim that R∗ > 1.
We will now estimate the difference between Z+ij/Z
−
ij and R(
i
N
, j
N
). Using
(27), we have
Z+ij
Z−ij
=
(1− i
N
)fij
j
N
gij + (1− iN − jN )hij
.
Using also the definition (44) of R, we get
Z+ij
Z−ij
−R( i
N
,
j
N
) = (45)
=
(1− i
N
)
{
fij[
j
N
G( i
N
, j
N
) + (1− i
N
− j
N
)H( i
N
, j
N
)]− F ( i
N
, j
N
)[ j
N
gij + (1− iN − jN )hij]
}
[ j
N
gij + (1− iN − jN )hij][ jNG( iN , jN ) + (1− iN − jN )H( iN , jN )]
=
(1− i
N
)φi,j,N
[ j
N
gij + (1− iN − jN )hij][ jNG( iN , jN ) + (1− iN − jN )H( iN , jN )]
, (46)
where
φi,j,N =
{
fij − F ( i
N
,
j
N
)
}[
j
N
G(
i
N
,
j
N
) + (1− i
N
− j
N
)H(
i
N
,
j
N
)
]
+
+ F (
i
N
,
j
N
)
{
j
N
[G(
i
N
,
j
N
)− gij] + (1− i
N
− j
N
)[H(
i
N
,
j
N
)− hij]
}
.
If M1 ≡ infN∈N min(i,j)∈ΛN{gij, hij, G( iN , jN ), H( iN , jN )}, then the denomi-
nator in (46) is bounded below by (1− i
N
)2M21 . By the continuity in Λ of G
and H and by formulas analogous to (22) for G and H, we know that M1 is
finite and positive.
We can also find an upper bound for the φi,j,N in the numerator. Let
M2 ≡ max(x,y)∈Λ{F (x, y), G(x, y), H(x, y)}. By (22) and analogous expres-
sions, there also exists a constant c > 0 such that for all N ∈ N,
max
(i,j)∈ΛN
{|F ( i
N
,
j
N
)− fij|, |G( i
N
,
j
N
)− gij|, |H( i
N
,
j
N
)− hij|} < c
N
.
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Using these bounds, we get |φi,j,N | < (1− iN )2cM2N .
Putting together the bounds for numerator and denominator in (46), we
can see that there exists a constant K such that∣∣∣∣∣Z+ijZ−ij −R( iN , jN )
∣∣∣∣∣ < KN .
Let now s = 1
2
(R∗ + 1) and N∗ be the smallest integer not smaller than
K
R∗−s . Then, forN > N
∗ and i
N
> x∗ we have
Z+ij
Z−ij
≥ s for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N−
i}. By Theorem 6 we conclude that limN→∞AN(x, y) = 1 for all (x, y) ∈ Λ
with x > x∗. 
Theorem 9 ahead deals with a situation which is in some sense inverse to
that in Theorem 7. We suppose there that F (1, 0) < G(1, 0) and F (1, 0) <
H(1, 0). This, by continuity, implies that in a neighborhood of the point
(1, 0) ∈ Λ strategy A is the least fit. In the replicator dynamics, this hypoth-
esis implies that vertex A is a repeller of the dynamics. Despite that, it is
not true that AN(x, y)→ 0 as N →∞ if x is close to 1.
Before enunciating Theorem 9, we make a definition for Moran processes
with three strategies analogous to another definition made in Appendix A
for birth-death processes.
Let i > i∗. We define αi,j\i∗ as the probability with initial condition (i, j)
that strategy A fixates without ever returning to any among the states (i∗, k)
k = 0, 1, ..., N− i∗. In other words, in αi,j\i∗ we take into account only events
in which strategy A fixates and the number of A individuals is always larger
than i∗. Similarly, for x > x∗ and N large enough so that [Nx] > [Nx∗], we
define AN\x∗(x, y) = α[Nx],[Ny]\[Nx∗].
We start by stating a preparatory result analogous to Theorem 6:
Theorem 8 Consider a Moran process with three strategies. Suppose there
exist s ∈ (0, 1), N∗ ∈ N and x∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that if N ≥ N∗ and i
N
> x∗,
then
Z+ij
Z−ij
≤ s
holds ∀j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − i}. Then
lim
N→∞
AN\x∗(x, y) = 0
for all (x, y) ∈ Λ with x > x∗.
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We do not write a complete proof of Theorem 8, because it is analogous
to the proof of Theorem 6, but we explain the important differences. First
of all, instead of using a lower bound comparison birth-death process, we
take an upper bound (41). The conclusion is a consequence of Theorem 12
in Appendix A.
It is not possible to obtain the stronger result AN(x, y) → 0 as N →
∞, because AN(x, y) ≥ AN\x∗(x, y). Not only we are not able to prove
that AN(x, y) → 0, but we can give an example in which the hypotheses
of Theorem 8 are fulfilled but we have for all (x, y) ∈ Λ with x > 0 that
AN(x, y)→ 1. Just take a pay-off matrix
M =
a b bc d d
c d d

with a, b, c and d all positive, a < c and d < b. The peculiar form of M implies
that individuals adopting strategies B and C have the same fitness for any
population composition. As a result, for the sake of calculating the fixation
probabilities it is as if we had only two strategies. Thus αij is independent of
j and can be calculated by (4). Inequality a < c guarantees that F (1, 0) <
G(1, 0) = H(1, 0), which, by continuity, implies Z+ij/Z
−
ij ≤ s < 1 for i close to
N . The other inequality d < b implies that strategies B and C are not Nash
equilibria. This is a hypothesis necessary for using Theorem 5 in [5]. Using
the notation of the above cited work, by taking d close enough to 0 we get
L(1) < 0. According to Theorem 5 in [5], we will have limN→∞AN(x, y) = 1
for all (x, y) ∈ Λ with x > 0.
Due to the above example, the best result analogous to Theorem 6 we
can have is
Theorem 9 Consider a Moran process with three strategies. If F (1, 0) <
G(1, 0) and F (1, 0) < H(1, 0), then there exists x∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that
lim
N→∞
AN\x∗(x, y) = 0
for all (x, y) ∈ Λ with x > x∗.
We may omit the proof because it is just a repetition of the ideas in the
proof of Theorem 7 of approximating Z+ij/Z
−
ij by R(
i
N
, j
N
) and then using
Theorem 8.
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The example after Theorem 8 shows that if strategy A is the least fit and
it is close to fixation, then for large N its fixation probability may even be
close to 1. This will not happen if A is the least fit strategy in a region away
from its fixation. This is the content of our last result in this section.
Theorem 10 Consider a Moran process with three strategies. If there exists
x∗ ∈ (0, 1] such that F (x, y) < G(x, y) and F (x, y) < H(x, y) ∀ (x, y) ∈ Λ
with x < x∗, then limN→∞AN(x, y) = 0 for all (x, y) ∈ Λ with x < x∗.
Proof We only sketch the proof, because it is again similar to preceding
ones. We use the upper bound (41) for αij in Theorem 5. In order to prove
the thesis, we should show that for fixed x < x∗ we have piup[Nx] → 0 when
N → ∞. Hypotheses F (x, y) < G(x, y) and F (x, y) < H(x, y) if (x, y) ∈ Λ
and x < x∗ make sure that rupi ≡ a
up
i
bupi
≤ s < 1 if N is large enough and
i < Nx∗.
The result that, for x < x∗, piup[Nx] → 0 when N → ∞ may be attained
in two equivalent ways. One is to develop for i < i∗ a result analogous to
Proposition 4 for the probability of fixation at state 0 of the comparison
chain without attaining state i∗. The other way is proving by Theorem 11
that the fixation probability at state N of the dual process, see formulas (5)
to (7), tends to 1 as N →∞. 
It is important to remember that, with a few exceptions, all the results
presented since the beginning of Sect. 3 refer to the fixation of the A strategy.
By making appropriate adjustments in the hypotheses, analogous results are
also valid for the fixation of strategies B and C.
5 The evolution of cooperation with three
strategies from a stochastic point of view
In [16] some results were proved for the replicator dynamics in a model for
the evolution of cooperation in a population with three strategies. In this
section, after a brief description of the problem, we intend to use some of
the results proved so far for the Moran process with three strategies to gain
some understanding of the stochastic version of the results obtained in that
paper.
[14] considered a population with 100 types of individuals following differ-
ent reactive strategies for the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (IRPD).
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In the prisoner’s dilemma, individuals may at each interaction either coop-
erate or defect. Reactive strategies are characterized by two parameters:
loyalty and forgiveness. The loyalty of a reactive strategy is the probability
that the player adopting this strategy cooperates after receiving coopera-
tion in the previous interaction. The forgiveness is the probability that the
player cooperates after receiving a defection in the previous interaction. Al-
though reactive strategies are characterized by probabilities, the pay-offs in
the IRPD are deterministically calculated as an average of infinitely many
interactions [13]. Nowak and Sigmund numerically solved the replicator dy-
namics for this population, a system of 99 ordinary differential equations.
Their numerical solution suggested that among the 100 strategies, only three
play a prominent role in their numerical experiment.
The first prominent strategy is ALLD: individuals which always defect.
The second important strategy is ATFT (almost tit-for-tat): individuals with
loyalty close to 1 and small positive forgiveness. The third strategy, which we
will denote as G (generous), has loyalty equal to 1, and positive forgiveness
q larger than the forgiveness of the ATFT.
In the numerical experiment by [14], initially the population frequency of
most strategies is strongly depleted, with the exception of strategies closest
to ALLD. After this initial period, the frequency of strategies close to ATFT
increased, almost attaining the whole population. But the ultimate winner
in their simulations was a surprisingly cooperative strategy which they called
GTFT (generous tit-for-that), i.e. a strategy of the G kind with an optimum
value of q which allows the followers of this strategy not to be too much
exploited by defectors. This optimum value of q turned out to be 1/3 for the
parameter values used in their experiment.
[16] studied a simplified version of the extremely complicated population
in [14]. They considered only three kinds of individuals adopting the afore
mentioned prominent reactive strategies: ALLD, ATFT and G. The forgive-
ness parameter q of the G individuals may be varied. The results of [16] show
that, according to the value of q, there are several different scenarios for which
strategies survive in the infinite time limit and, consequently, different types
of evolution of cooperation, or non-evolution of cooperation, may occur. In
particular, they prove that there exists a threshold value for q under which
the result of the numerical experiment by Nowak and Sigmund holds. More
exactly, in a population with the three types of individuals above mentioned,
existence is proved of a threshold qGTFT such that for q < qGTFT there will be
a region with positive area such that for initial conditions in this region only
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G individuals will survive. When only G individuals survive the scenario is
termed one in which full evolution of cooperation holds.
We will consider fixed numerical values for the parameters in [16], so that
the pay-off matrix M is also fixed. Our parameter choice is such that q is
below the threshold qGTFT for full evolution of cooperation. More concretely,
the pay-off matrix considered is
M =
 3.00 0.67 2.612.33 1.00 1.40
2.97 0.90 2.25
 , (47)
where strategy A (numbered 1 in the matrix) is G, strategy B (numbered 2)
is ALLD, and strategy C (numbered 3) is ATFT. The reader consulting [16]
should be aware that the numbering of strategies here differs with respect
to that paper. Fig. 2 shows some orbits of the replicator dynamics for the
pay-off matrix (47). Complete specification of parameter choices and other
useful information may be found in the caption of that figure.
Just by looking at the above pay-off matrix, we know that strategies A
and B are both strict Nash equilibria, whereas strategy C is not a Nash
equilibrium. By the results of [16], we know that for the value of q used in
(47) there is no interior equilibrium for the dynamics and no equilibrium on
side AC. On the side AC A is always fitter than C. On the side AB we have
an equilibrium, depicted as P12 in Fig. 2, such that above P12 on that side,
B is fitter than A, but A is fitter than B below P12. On the side BC we have
an equilibrium P23 such that B is fitter than C above it and C is fitter than
B below it.
We also show in Fig. 2 the lines in which the deterministic fitnesses F ,
G and H defined in (21) are pairwise equal. These lines divide the ABC
triangle in regions where the fitness ranking is fixed. It can be seen that
above the blue line we have G > H > F , between the blue and red lines we
have H > G > F , between the red and green lines we have H > F > G and,
finally, below the green line we have F > H > G.
Let x∗1 denote the fraction of A individuals at the point in which the line
F = H intercepts the AB side. The fitness ranking given above shows that if
x > x∗1, then F > H > G. We can then readily apply Theorem 7 to conclude
that for initial conditions (x, y) in the red region close to vertex A in the
left panel of Fig. 3 we have limN→∞AN(x, y) = 1. Similarly, if y∗1 denotes
the fraction of B individuals at the point P23, then, for y > y
∗
1 we have
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AB
C
P12
P23
Figure 2: Some orbits for the replicator dynamics with pay-off matrix in (47).
Strategy A is G (generous), strategy B is ALLD (always defect), and strategy
C is ATFT (almost tit-for-tat). The parameters for the prisoner’s dilemma
(see [16] or [14]) are T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0. The G strategy has a
forgiveness parameter q = 1/3 and the ATFT has loyalty equal to 0.9 and
forgiveness 0.1. Besides the vertices of the triangle, the only equilibria of the
dynamics for this choice of parameters and strategies are the points P12 and
P13. P12 is a repeller and P23 is a saddle point. All orbits inside the triangle
and above the separatrix joining these two equilibria converge to vertex B
and all orbits inside the triangle and below the same separatrix converge to
vertex A. Strategies ALLD and G are strict Nash equilibria. Let F , G and
H denote as elsewhere in this paper the deterministic fitnesses (21). The red
line is the set of points in which F = G. The green line is the set of points
in which F = H. The blue line is the set of points in which G = H.
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C
P12
P23
++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++A
B
C
P12
P23
Figure 3: The red, green and blue lines and points P12 and P23 are the same
as defined in the caption of Fig. 2. Left panel: The red region close to vertex
A is the one in which we can use Theorem 7 to prove that AN(x, y) tends
to 1 when N → ∞. The blue region close to B is, by an analogue of the
same theorem, the one in which we can prove that BN(x, y) tends to 1 when
N →∞. Arguments in this section prove that besides the red region we can
prove that limN→∞AN(x, y) = 1 also in the gray region. Right panel: The
crosses on sides AB and AC are the numerically determined locations, for
each fixed value of i, of the minimum over j of the Z+ij . The pay-off matrix
is (47) and population size is N = 200.
G > H > F . By an analogue of the same Theorem, limN→∞BN(x, y) = 1 if
(x, y) is in the blue region in the left panel of Figure 3.
Another of our results we can use is Theorem 10. If we denote y∗2 the
fraction of type B individuals at point P12, then the fitness ranking already
exhibited shows that B is the least fit strategy for all (x, y) ∈ Λ with y < y∗2.
By an analogue of Theorem 10, BN(x, y)
N→∞→ 0 for such points.
Although BN(x, y)
N→∞→ 0 does not mean that the fixation probability
for strategy A should be large, the above result along with the orbits in Fig.
2 suggest that we might possibly find a region larger than the red region in
the left panel of Fig. 3 in which AN(x, y)
N→∞→ 1.
As already commented at the beginning of Sect. 4, the results proved
there, Theorem 7 included, did not rely on locating the maximum or mini-
mum over j of the Z+ij . We will exhibit an argument based on simple numer-
ical calculations and also on Theorem 5 that strongly suggests that we can
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find a larger region in which AN(x, y)
N→∞→ 1. In order to use Theorem 5, we
will need to locate the cited minima.
A problem here is that Z+ij is a complicated function depending on i, j, w,N
and the pay-off matrix elements. We were not able to rigorously locate for
each i the maximum over j of the Z+ij . Even if we simplified the expression
for Z+ by taking a deterministic limit, as we have done in many places in
this paper, we still could not show that the location of the minima of the
expression was stable under small variations of the pay-off matrix values. In-
stead of presenting such long and not so conclusive calculation, we preferred
to fix the pay-off matrix (47), take population size N = 200 and numerically
locate for each fixed value of i, the minimum over j of the Z+ij . This is a
very simple computational task and the results are shown at the right panel
in Fig. 3. We repeated the same task for larger values of N and the results
were not changed.
If we take for exact the result of these numerical calculations, we can now
enlarge the region in which we have AN(x, y)
N→∞→ 1. Let x∗2 be the fraction
of A individuals at point P12 and x
∗
3 be the same for the point in the right
panel of Fig. 3 in which the location of the minima of Z+ij changes abruptly
from the AB side to the AC side.
Reminding the reader of Proposition 2 and using the notation of Theorem
5, we see that for [Nx∗2] < i < [Nx
∗
3] we have
alowi = Z
+
i,N−i =
i(N − i)fi,N−i
ifi,N−i + (N − i)gi,N−i
and
blowi = Z
−
i,N−i =
i(N − i)gi,N−i
ifi,N−i + (N − i)gi,N−i .
Thus, for these values of i, rlowi = a
low
i /b
low
i = fi,N−i/gi,N−i. For large enough
N , fi,N−i/gi,N−i is arbitrarily approximated by F ( iN , 1 − iN )/G( iN , 1 − iN ).
As F > G at all points on side AB with x > x∗2, then r
low
i > 1 if [Nx
∗
2] < i <
[Nx∗3] and N is large enough.
If, on the other hand, i > [Nx∗3], then
alowi = Z
+
i,0 =
i(N − i)fi,0
ifi,0 + (N − i)hi,0
and
blowi = Z
−
i,0 =
i(N − i)hi,0
ifi,0 + (N − i)hi,0 .
33
It follows that if i > [Nx∗3], then r
low
i = fi,0/hi,0 > 1, because on the AC side
F > H everywhere.
Because rlowi is determined by relative fitnesses calculated on sides AC
and AB and on these sides we are dealing with Moran processes with two
strategies, it is easy to prove a bit more: if we accept that the numerically
calculated location of the minima of Z+ij for each i is exact, then there exists
s > 1 such that for N large enough and i > Nx∗2, r
low
i > s. Using Theorem
11, we may conclude that for all (x, y) ∈ Λ with x > x∗2, AN(x, y) N→∞→ 1.
This region is the union of the gray and red regions depicted in the left panel
of Fig. 3.
6 Conclusions
When we started working on the subject of Moran process with three or more
strategies, we had as an optimistic goal to provide a complete classification
of all possible behaviors, either as [18] did for the Moran process with two
strategies, or as [3] did for the replicator dynamics with three strategies. We
see we are still very far from achieving this goal, but we believe that this
paper may be a good starting point for further work.
As a first important achievement, we introduced coupling of stochastic
processes as a tool for obtaining results for the Moran process with three
or more strategies. More specifically, we used coupling to obtain upper and
lower bounds of general validity for the fixation probabilities.
We do not claim that our general upper and lower bounds in Theorem 5
are optimal. In fact, although Theorems 2 and 3 allow more flexibility, the
general recipe of Theorem 5 with its maxima and minima taken over all j
may produce too small lower bounds or too large upper bounds. Nonetheless,
this general recipe has proved powerful enough for proving in some cases, see
results in Sect. 4, that some strategies may fixate or be extinct with large
probability if the population size N is large.
In Sect. 5 we applied these results to a concrete problem. This appli-
cation showed at the same time usefulness and weakness of the results in
the preceding sections. Usefulness because we readily found some regions in
which some strategies were either fixated with large probability, or extinct
with large probability. Weakness because when we tried to find a larger re-
gion in which the G strategy had a large fixation probability, we were faced
with the difficulty in determining, for fixed i, the location of the points in
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which Z+ij was minimized over j.
We hope that our results may prove useful in other applications, or else,
that work in other applications may suggest some better bounds for fixation
probabilities.
A Some results on birth-death processes
This appendix collects some results which we did not want to insert in the
main text of the paper, because they have to do only with birth-death pro-
cesses. Despite that, these results were used in the proof of the theorems in
Section 4, all of them referring to Moran processes with three strategies. The
more important results here are Theorems 11 and 12, which are cited in the
proofs in the main text. The propositions which precede them are necessary
for their proofs.
The first result here deals with comparing fixation probabilities for two
birth-death processes in which the birth to death ratio is larger in one process
than in the other. We observe that this result might be proved by a coupling
argument similar to the one shown in Theorem 2. We opt here for a direct
proof using the exact expressions (4) for the fixation probabilities.
Proposition 3 Consider two birth-death processes with the same set of states
S = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}. Let ri ≡ ai/bi be the birth to death ratio in the first
process and si ≡ a′i/b′i be the ratio in the second process. Let also pii and
pi′i denote the respective fixation probabilities in state N . If ri > si for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, then pii > pi′i for all i ∈ S \ {0, N}.
Proof We start by rewriting expression (4) for pii:
pii =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
=
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k +
∑N−1
j=i
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
=
1
1 +
∑N−1
j=i
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
1+
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
.
A similar expression may be written for pi′i just by writing sk in place of rk.
Let
di =
∑N−1
j=i
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
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be the denominator minus 1 in the last expression and d′i be the same ex-
pression with rk exchanged by sk. We will prove that d
′
i − di > 0, which of
course implies pii > pi
′
i.
d′i − di =(∑N−1
j=i
∏j
k=1 s
−1
k
)(
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
)
−
(∑N−1
j=i
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
)(
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 s
−1
k
)
(
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
)(
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 s
−1
k
)
=
∑N−1
j=i
(∏j
k=1 s
−1
k −
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
)
(
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
)(
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 s
−1
k
)
+
(∑N−1
j=i
∏j
k=1 s
−1
k
)(∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
)
−
(∑N−1
j=i
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
)(∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 s
−1
k
)
(
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 r
−1
k
)(
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 s
−1
k
) .
Using the fact that s−1k > r
−1
k > 0 for all k, both numerator and denominator
in the first term in the last expression are clearly positive. To see that the
second term is positive, too, notice that its denominator is the same of the
first term, and its numerator, with some patience, may be rewritten as
i−1∑
j=1
(
j∏
k=1
r−1k s
−1
k
)
N−i∑
`=1
(
N−`∏
m=j+1
s−1m −
N−`∏
m=j+1
r−1m
)
,
now manifestly positive. 
Proposition 4 Consider a birth-death process with state space S = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}.
If ri is the ratio of birth to death probabilities and i
∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1} is
some fixed state, then the probability pii\i∗ that the process starts at i > i∗ and
fixates at state N without ever passing by state i∗ is
pii\i∗ =
1 +
∑i−i∗−1
`=1
∏`
k=1 r
−1
i∗+k
1 +
∑N−i∗−1
`=1
∏`
k=1 r
−1
i∗+k
. (48)
Proof Our result (48) may be obtained from (4), noticing that the
boundary condition pi0 = 0 is replaced by pii∗\i∗ = 0 and the set of states
{0, 1, 2, . . . , N} is replaced by {i∗, i∗ + 1, . . . , N}. 
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The following result, Proposition 5, is just a straightforward adaptation
of the result in Proposition 3 to the fixation probability pii∗\i∗ defined in
Proposition 4. As the proof is a mere repetition, we do not write it here.
Proposition 5 Consider two birth-death processes with the same set of states
S = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}. Let ri ≡ ai/bi and si ≡ a′i/b′i be the respective birth
to death ratios. Suppose that there exists i∗ such that ri > si for i =
i∗ + 1, i∗ + 2, . . . , N − 1. If i > i∗ and pii\i∗ and pi′i\i∗ denote the fixation
probabilities in state N with the additional condition that the process never
passes by state i∗, then pii\i∗ > pi′i\i∗ for all i ∈ {i∗ + 1, i∗ + 2, . . . , N − 1}.
The next result is the key ingredient in the proof of Theorem 6 in the
main text.
Theorem 11 Suppose that for large enough values of N we have a family of
birth-death processes with birth to death ratios r
(N)
i and fixation probabilities
pi
(N)
i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. Let x ∈ (0, 1) and ΠN(x) ≡ pi(N)[Nx]. If there exist
s > 1 and x∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for N large enough and i > Nx∗ we have
r
(N)
i > s, then
lim
N→∞
ΠN(x) = 1
for x > x∗.
Proof Let pi′i be the fixation probability of a birth-death process with
frequency independent fitness si = s and let pi
′
i\i∗ be as in Proposition 5.
Summing the geometric progressions appearing in (48) when ri is replaced
by s, we get
pi′i\i∗ =
1− s−(i−i∗)
1− s−(N−i∗) .
Suppose x > x∗ and N large enough so that [Nx] > [Nx∗]. Of course,
pi
(N)
[Nx] ≥ pi(N)[Nx]\[Nx∗]. As, by Proposition 5, we have pi(N)[Nx]\[Nx∗] > pi′[Nx]\[Nx∗],
then
pi
(N)
[Nx] >
1− s−([Nx]−[Nx∗])
1− s−(N−[Nx∗]) .
Our conclusion follows because, if s > 1, the last expression tends to 1 when
N →∞. 
The next result here is quite analogous to Theorem 11 in its proof, but
it comes with a surprise: although we will be able to prove that, under the
stated hypotheses, pi
(N)
[Nx]\[Nx∗] tends to 0 as N →∞, we cannot conclude that
pi
(N)
[Nx] tends to 0, too.
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Theorem 12 Suppose that for large enough values of N we have a family of
birth-death processes with birth to death ratios r
(N)
i and fixation probabilities
pi
(N)
i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. Suppose also that there exist 0 < s < 1 and
x∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all N and i > Nx∗ we have r(N)i < s. If x > x∗ and
ΠN\x∗(x) ≡ pi(N)[Nx]\[Nx∗], then
lim
N→∞
ΠN\x∗(x) = 0 .
The proof of the above result is analogous to the proof of Theorem 11
and is left to the interested reader. We comment instead on why we cannot
arrive at a result completely analogous to Theorem 11.
The first reason is that inequality pi
(N)
[Nx] ≥ pi(N)[Nx]\[Nx∗] used in proving
Theorem 11 is still valid and we cannot in general conclude that a quantity
larger than or equal to something tending to 0 tends to 0, too.
More than that, we know that in a birth-death process for two strategies
we can fulfill the hypotheses of Theorem 12 and still have limN→∞ pi
(N)
[Nx] = 1.
This is proved for Moran processes with two strategies in [5], Theorem 5, if
certain conditions on the pay-off matrix are valid. The conditions are m11 <
m21, m12 > m22, i.e. neither of the two strategies is a Nash equilibrium, and
L(1) ≡ −
∫ 1
0
log
1− w + w[m11t+m12(1− t)]
1− w + w[m21t+m22(1− t)] dt < 0 . (49)
In the interesting situation in which the hypotheses of Theorem 12 are
fulfilled and we also have limN→∞ pi
(N)
[Nx] = 1, we have for large N and x > x
∗
both ΠN(x) close to 1 and ΠN\x∗(x) close to 0. This means that although
fixation at state N is very probable, most probably the chain will pass at least
once (thus, it will probably pass many times) by x∗ before fixation occurs.
An application of the above phenomenon, in which a repeller strategy in the
replicator dynamics fixates with high probability in the Moran process, is
given by [11].
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